

Tracing the Early Developments of Tibetan Epistemological Categories in Rngog Blo ldan shes rab's (1059-1109) Concise Guide to the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*¹

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ABSTRACT The recent publication of the *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum* collection is opening the way for new research in the field of Tibetan Buddhist epistemology by giving us access to some of the earliest indigenous compositions in the domain. This paper focuses on one of the two recovered epistemological works by the great scholar and translator Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109): his concise guide to the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, a commentary composed by Dharmottara (8th c.) on Dharmakīrti's (7th c. or earlier) *Nyāyabindu*. The first part of my paper provides a general introduction to Rngog Blo ldan shes rab's concise guide, which I am in the process of editing and translating. The description of the manuscript and a detailed presentation of the contents of the text will be provided in the introduction to this forthcoming study. I concentrate here on its place within Rngog Blo ldan shes rab's contributions as a translator and exegete and in relation with the spread of Dharmakīrti's works in Tibet. I discuss in particular the circumstances of its composition, its intended function and potential impact. In the second part of the paper I show how such

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compositions allow shedding light on the emergence of categories that became building blocks for the Tibetan indigenous epistemological system. I illustrate this process for a well-known feature that stands as the trademark of the mainstream system developed by thinkers associated with Gsang phu monastery and the Rngog tradition of epistemology: the fivefold typology of invalid cognitions.

Part I. Rngog Blo ldan shes rab and his Concise Guide to the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*

The rich material from the library of 'Bras spungs monastery that was published in the *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum* collection include a number of epistemological works that are extremely important for our understanding of the early indigenous contributions in the domain, contributions that opened the way to all subsequent developments, either in the form of continuity or critical reaction. In particular, this collection contains works by some of the most influential scholars in the field.

The author considered in this paper, Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109)²—hereafter Rngog Lo—stands at the very source of the so-called "New epistemology" (*tshad ma gsar ma*) that arose in the early centuries of the Later Diffusion (*phyi dar*) of Buddhism in Tibet.³ In addition to his impressive contribution to the translation and revision of the founding Indian treatises in the domain, Rngog Lo initiated a line of interpretation that dominated the Tibetan landscape until the 13th century, albeit not as a unified, monolithic entity: Rngog Lo's disciples and their successors provided individual inputs and adjusted preceding interpretations. The works of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169), who was the sixth abbot of Gsang phu Ne'u thog,⁴ and his student Gtsang nag pa Brtson 'grus seng ge (?-after 1195)⁵ are good examples of such a process.

2 These dates are provisional and might need to be revised. On his life and works, see van der Kuijp 1983, Jackson 1994, Kano 2006, Kramer 2007.

3 We do not know much about the "Old epistemology" (*tshad ma rnying ma*) of the early years of the Later Diffusion. It is associated with the translation of Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* by Rma Lo tsā ba Dge ba'i blo gros and with the name of Khyung po Grags se, none of whose works have survived. See van der Kuijp 1983: 1-3.

4 See van der Kuijp 1978: 355-6 and 1983: chap. 2. Phya pa's teachers include Gro lung pa Blo gros 'byung gnas, who was a direct disciple of Rngog Lo, and Rgya dmar pa Byang chub grags, who studied with two disciples of Rngog Lo: Khyung Rin chen grags and Gangs pa she'u Blo gros byang chub. Phya pa's two teachers authored a commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. An "epistemological summary" (*tshad ma'i bsduṣ pa*) is also ascribed to the second. Cf. van der Kuijp 1983: 59-61.

5 See van der Kuijp 1983: 69 and 1989.

1. Situating the Concise Guide among Rngog Lo's Contributions

1.1 Extant Epistemological Works by Rngog Lo

The two epistemological works by Rngog Lo that have become available are the earliest extant indigenous writings on the subject:

— One is a commentarial work on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PVin) entitled *Tshad ma rnam nges kyī dka' gnas rnam bshad* (hereafter referred to as *Dka' gnas*). The expression *dka' gnas rnam bshad* literally means an "explanation of the difficult points." As announced in the title, this work only deals with selected portions of the PVin. Rngog Lo systematically examines Dharmottara's commentary on these passages in the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (PVinṬ) and frequently adduces also the interpretation of other Indian exegetes of Dharmakīrti, such as Prajñākaragupta, Śāṅkaranandana, Śākyabuddhi and Kamalaśīla. Although it is selective, it is a large work, counting 123 and 132 folios respectively in the two available manuscripts.⁶

—The second is the text under consideration in this paper, a commentarial work on the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (NBT), a commentary by Dharmottara on Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* (NB). A single copy of this text survived (so far we know) and found its way into the collection of manuscripts of 'Bras spungs monastery.⁷ The mention "phyi, zha, 21" on its first page indicates that it was brought in from outside,⁸ and was catalogued in the category of epistemological treatises (zha)⁹ with the number 21.¹⁰ No title is indicated in the body of the

6 Both manuscripts, which were preserved at that time in Beijing at the Tibetan Library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities, are described in van der Kuijp 1994: 6-7. An edition of one of them was published in book format in 1994. A copy of the other is found in the *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum*. See *Dka' gnas* in the bibliography. Krasser 1997: 63-4 discusses the orthographic features of the first manuscript. For preliminary remarks on this work see van der Kuijp 2003 and Hugon 2008: 27-8.

7 The unique manuscript of this text, listed in *'Bras spungs dkar chag* as no. 016371, was reproduced in the *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum* (see *Rigs thigs 'grel ṭi ka* in the bibliography), where it is wrongly identified as a *bsdus don* on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. Detailed information about the manuscript, including its orthographical characteristics, will be provided in the introduction to my forthcoming edition and translation of the text. This manuscript was the basis for an edition of the text in book format in a collection regrouping the writing of Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (see *Rngog chos skor* in the bibliography). The text appears here also with the misleading title *Tshad ma rnam nges kyī bsdus don*.

8 Another interpretation is that *phyi* indicates a text "in circulation" in opposition to manuscripts bearing the inscription *nang*, "internal," indicating restricted access (van der Kuijp 1994: 2).

9 See *'Bras spungs dkar chag* 14-5 for a list of the thematic markers used in this collection.

10 The numbering of the works in this collection is puzzling. It is not chronological and does not reflect the size of the documents. Works by a same author are also not numbered consecutively. A further problem is that there are several works with the same number. Notably, there are two other works marked "zha 21" in addition to the one under consideration: the *Tshad ma rnam nges kyī ṭikka blo gsal mgul rgyan* by Byang chub sems dpa' Jñānaśrī (vol. 44) and the anonymous *Tshad ma rnam 'grel le'u gsum pa'i rnam bshad* (vol. 45).

text or the colophon. I take the indication "*mtshan nyid kyi chos*" written on the first page of the manuscript to be a descriptive identification of the text rather than its original title. This text is of relatively short size (21 folios for the manuscript in the *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum*). I describe it as a "concise guide." To give an idea of its form (which is well illustrated in the portion translated in part II of this paper): the text takes up the NBT portion by portion; each portion is delineated by the mention of the first and/or last word(s) in the Tibetan translation. These portions are presented linearly, but organized into a hierarchical structure by means of successive subdivisions. The delineated portions of the source text are summarized and/or paraphrased, and their content is explained in more or less details. Some are the occasion of longer excursuses. In some cases also the author expresses his disagreement with Dharmottara and presents his own understanding of the topic.

Authorship

In the concise guide, the author of the text is identified in the colophon as "the Buddhist monk Blo ldan shes rab" (*shag kya'i dge slong blo ldan shes rab kyis sbyar ba*), in *Dka' gnas* as "the translator, the Buddhist monk Blo ldan shes rab" (*lo tsa ba shag kya'i dge slong blo ldan shes rab kyis sbyar ba*). There is no serious reason to doubt these attributions of authorship. The correspondence between the explanations provided in these two works is indicative of a single author for both. Bibliographers' lists confirm that Rngog Lo authored commentarial works dealing with NB/NBT and PVin/PVinT, but this is of course not a decisive argument. More convincing is the fact that one passage of the *Dka' gnas* literally corresponds to a quotation of Rngog Lo's views by Śākya mchog ldan, who identifies his source as the *Rnam par nges pa'i rnam bshad*, while many others correspond more or less literally to other quotations whose source is identified as the *Rnam par nges pa'i tī ka*, a different work on the PVin by Rngog Lo, which must have had many passages in common with the *Dka' gnas*.¹¹ Note that portions of the *Dka' gnas* are also found to be borrowed by later authors who integrate them in their own works without acknowledgement.¹² The philosophical evidence also speaks in favor of Rngog Lo's authorship, as views ascribed to

¹¹ See Hugon 2008: 21-2. Of the two citations whose source is identified as the *Rnam par nges pa'i rnam bshad* one is literally identical with a passage of the *Dka' gnas* but the other is not. Śākya mchog ldan might be paraphrasing the text in the second case. But it is also possible that he is citing from a commentarial work on the PVin different both from the *Dka' gnas* and from the other work he identifies as the *Rnam par nges pa'i tī ka*. This work would then have passages in common with the *Dka' gnas*.

¹² Portions of the *Dka' gnas* are for instance integrated in Phya pa's commentary on the PVin. Phya pa may be re-using the text of the *Dka' gnas* itself, but it is also possible that his source is another work of Rngog Lo with the same phrasing, or that he is re-using another work already re-using Rngog Lo's text. See Hugon (forthcoming).

Rngog Lo by later authors are attested in these two works.¹³

1.2 Rngog Lo's Contributions to Epistemology

The contributions to epistemology ascribed to Rngog Lo by his disciple and biographer Gro lung pa Blo gros 'byung gnas are listed below.¹⁴ Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364) lists the same works with minor terminological differences. Śākya mchog ldan has a similar list, but does not mention nos. 6, 7, 8, 11 and 14.

In the right columns I give the Sanskrit name of the source text commented upon and the name of its author. Underline indicates that the work was translated by Rngog Lo; dashed underline that Rngog Lo revised an existing translation. The case of the *Nyāyabindu* is unclear.¹⁵

1/2	Tshad ma rnam par nges pa ṭi ka dang bcas pa'i bsdus don / rnam bshad chen po	<u>Pramānaviniścaya</u> with <u>Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā</u>	Dharmakīrti Dharmottara
3/4	Rigs thigs 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i bsdus don / rnam bshad	<u>Nyāyabindu?</u> with <u>Nyāyabinduṭīkā</u>	Dharmakīrti Dharmottara

¹³ To give a single example, a long discussion in the context of argumentation by consequence (*thal 'gyur*) is reported by Phya pa as the position of "ancient scholars" (*sngon gyi mkhas pa dag*) or "the best among the best" (*che ba'i che ba nams*) (*Mun sel* 91b7ff.). This position is identified in the *Tshad bsdus* (354) as that of "lo tsā ba," i.e., "the translator," an expression which usually refers to Rngog Lo. The view under discussion is attested, albeit in a shorter version, in *Dka' gnas* 385ff.

¹⁴ This list is taken from Kano 2006: 126-7, which provides an exhaustive comparative table for all of Rngog Lo's writings. I disagree with Kano on the interpretation of no. 8. The expression *chos mchog chen po* ("The big Dharmottara") does not refer to Dharmottara himself, but is commonly used to designate the *Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā*, whereas *chos mchog chung* ("The small Dharmottara") is used for the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*. I think therefore that no. 8 refers to the portions on *apoha* of the *Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā* and not to the *Apoḥaprakaraṇa*, already listed under 10/11. According to my colleague Toshikazu Watanabe (personal communication), the theory of *apoha* is dealt with in the PVinṭ ad PVin 2.15-28. Other passages may also have been taken into consideration, such as the commentary on the famous three verses PVin 2.29-31 (=PV 1.40-2).

¹⁵ The translation of this text is ascribed to Rngog Lo in the colophon of the version found in the Sde dge canon, in Gro lung pa's list, in the catalogue by Bcom ldan Ral gri (Schaeffer & van der Kuijp 2009: 241), and Bu ston's catalogue (Lasic 2007: 487, n. 17). It is not found in the Peking canon or in the list by Bcom ldan Ral gri's disciple Dbus pa Blo gsal rtsod pa'i seng ge. Rgyal tshab cites a version of the colophon identifying Jinamitra, etc. as the translators (Lasic 2007: 491). The ascription of the canonical version to Rngog Lo was rejected by Lasic (Lasic 2007: 490-1) based on the noticeable lack of diligence applied by the translator or revisor, judged to be quite unlike Rngog Lo's achievement observable in other cases, such as the revision of the NBT-translation. Indeed, Lasic notes that the wording of the canonical version strikingly resembles the wording of the Dunhuang fragment of the NB (Lasic 2007: 487), and is also almost identical with the portions that can be extracted from the Tibetan translation of Vinītadeva by Jinamitra which dates from the time of the Earlier Diffusion (Lasic 2007: 489). According to Lasic (personal communication) it is conceivable that Rngog Lo authored a revised translation, which was known to Gro lung pa, Bcom ldan Ral gri and Bu ston, but was not accessible to Rgyal tshab and was also not accessible to or not taken into consideration by the editors of the canon.

5	Rnam 'grel rgyan dang bcas pa'i bsdus don	<u>Pramānavārttika</u> with <u>Pramānavārttikālamkāra</u>	Dharmakīrti Prajñākaragupta
6	Le'u dang po'i stod cung zad kyi rnam bshad	<u>Pramānavārttika</u> 1 beginning part ¹⁶	Dharmakīrti
7	Chos mchog chen po'i [man] ngag dang po'i tshigs su bcad pa bdun gyi bshad pa	<u>Pramānaviniścayatīkā</u> , 7 eulogy verses	Dharmottara
8	[de] 'i gzhan sel ba'i skabs cung zad bshad pa	<u>Pramānaviniścayatīkā</u> , passages on apoha	Dharmottara
9	Slob dpon chos mchog gi tshad ma brtag pa chung ba'i bsdus don	<u>Laghuprāmānyaparīkṣā</u>	Dharmottara
10/11	Sel ba grub pa'i bsdus don / stod kyi bshad pa	<u>Apoahasiddhi</u> (i.e., <u>Anyāpohanāmaprakaraṇa</u>)	Dharmottara
12	Skad cig 'jig pa grub pa'i bsdus don	<u>Ksanabhaṅgasiddhi</u>	Dharmottara
13/14	Bram ze chen po'i sel ba grub pa'i bsdus don / stod kyi rnam bshad	<u>Apoahasiddhi</u>	Śāṅkaranandana
15/16	'Brel ba grub pa'i bsdus don / stod kyi rnam par bshad pa	<u>Pratibandhasiddhi</u>	Śāṅkaranandana

We can see from this list that all works commented upon have been translated or revised by Rngog Lo himself (in collaboration with others). There are yet other epistemological works he translated, on which he did not write a commentary. They are, according to Gro lung pa's list: Dharmottara *Bṛhatprāmānyaparīkṣā*, Yamāri's subcommentary on Prajñākaragupta's *Pramānavārttikālamkāra*, Śāṅkaranandana's *Vārttikānusāra*, i.e., (*Pramāṇa*) *vārttikānusāriṇī*,¹⁷ and his *Madhyapramānyaparīkṣā*.¹⁸

The works he chose to comment (provided Gro lung pa's list is exhaustive) are first the three works of Dharmakīrti that qualify as "principal" in most traditional Tibetan classifications, i.e., the *Pramānavārttika* (PV), PVin and NB, each with a commentary.¹⁹ Then, he commented on portions of some of these works or commentaries singled out

¹⁶ Since Prajñākaragupta's commentary referred to in no. 5 only covers chapters 2-4 of the *Pramānavārttika*, it is possible that this entry referred to an explanation of the first chapter of the *Pramānavārttika*, maybe in conjunction with Śāṅkaranandana's incomplete commentary, whose translation is also ascribed to Rngog Lo.

¹⁷ See my remark in the preceding note.

¹⁸ Cf. Kramer 2007: 61-7.

¹⁹ Tibetan scholars often divide Dharmakīrti's works, referred to as the Collection of the Seven Treatises (*sde bdun*), into two groups: the PV, PVin and NB are categorized as the main works, the *Vādanyāya*, *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, *Santānāntarasiddhi* and *Hetubindu* as accessory works. The first three are compared to the body (*lus*), the other four to the limbs (*yan lag*). The earliest evidence of this classification that I could find so far is in gTsang nag pa's 12th-century *Bsdus pa* (2a1-2). If the *Tshad bsdus* is confirmed to be earlier than Gtsang nag pa, it would provide a yet earlier instance, as it makes this division also (see 2,14-3,16). This division is tagged "Tibetan" by Śākyā mchog ldan. For further references, see Hugon 2008: 64, n. 184.

in view of a specific topic for no. 8 or a compositional feature for no. 7.²⁰ Finally, he commented on individual works by Dharmottara and Śāṅkaranandana addressing specific topics: relations, the proof of momentariness, the definition of valid cognition, and the theory of "exclusion" (*apoha*)²¹ already singled out in no. 8.

1.3 A Terminological Issue

The bibliographers list two kinds of commentarial works for several cases. We thus find the pairs *bsdus don/rnam bshad chen po*, *bsdus don/rnam bshad*, *bsdus don/bshad pa*, and *bsdus don/rnam par bshad pa*. Such pairs are also found for Rngog Lo's composition on a number of other non-epistemological works. In Gro lung pa's list one finds both the expressions *bsdus don* and *don bsdus* for the first member of the pair.²² Bu ston's list of Rngog Lo's works sometimes uses *don bsdus* where Gro lung pa has *bsdus don*.²³

Now that some of the actual works referred to in these lists have become available, it becomes clear that these terms are not unproblematic. In order to clarify the discussion, let us distinguish two issues: one is how the texts call themselves, the other is how bibliographers refer to them.²⁴

(1) First, works that include these terms in their title are not representative of a unique genre. Notably, among extant works entitled *bsdus don* one finds synoptic tables (texts presenting a hierarchical arrangement of the contents of an Indian treatise, but giving only the titles of the subdivisions, in the way of a table of contents), but also more substantial works where the Indian source text is explained portion by portion.²⁵ Not only do the texts of different authors testify to these distinct uses of the title *bsdus don* (one may refer for instance to the texts published in the *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum*, which includes examples of both), this alternation is found even for single authors. Notably, among the recovered writings of Rngog Lo, there are two works on the *Ratnagoṭṭravibhāga*, one entitled *bsdus don*, which is a two-folio synoptic table (see Kano 2008), the other entitled *don bsdus pa*,

²⁰ Note that one also finds an extensive discussion of the eulogy verse in the concise guide to the NBT.

²¹ This theory plays a crucial role in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's works to make sense of conceptual and linguistic activities in the absence of real universals. According to this theory, the grouping of particulars and the use of generic terms does not rely on a common property, but rather on the exclusion of instances from a complement class. For instance, what all cows have in common is merely that they are apprehended as not being non-cows.

²² Kramer (2007: 112, n. 176) notes that Gro lung pa uses the term *bsdus don* for the first member of the pair up to a certain point, and then only uses *don bsdus* or *don bsdus pa*.

²³ See Kramer 2007: 126.

²⁴ I leave here aside the questions of possible Indian precedents for the corresponding types of composition, and of the use of corresponding Sanskrit expressions for work titles and hermeneutic categories. These questions are dealt with in details in Kano 2008: 140-7.

²⁵ See Kano 2008 and Hugon 2009: 56-8.

which is a longer exposition covering 66 folios in two of the block prints (see Jackson 1993). Could it be that Rngog Lo actually differentiates *bsdus don* and *don bsdus*? It does not seem to be the case, because two other synoptic tables by Rngog Lo have the title *don bsdus pa*: a synoptic table of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (Kano 2008: 130, n. 13), and one of the *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya* commentary.²⁶ The remaining of Rngog Lo's available works entitled *don bsdus pa* belong to the category of longer explanation.²⁷

Concerning the second member of the bibliographer's pairs—*rnam bshad chen po*, *rnam bshad*, *bshad pa*, *rnam par bshad pa*—the only available text by Rngog Lo that has a matching term in its title would be the above-mentioned explanation of the difficult points of the PVin entitled *Dka' gnas rnam bshad*.

(2) The terminology used by the authors himself is not always univocal, as we have seen in the case of the term *bsdus don*. When considering the terminology used by bibliographers, the question is open whether they use these terms univocally, and in a sense that matches that adopted by the authors of the texts. Indeed, bibliographers do not appear to be listing titles, but rather to be providing a descriptive denomination of an author's contribution.

It is thus, in my opinion, appropriate to exercise caution when considering bibliographical lists to draw conclusions pertaining to the form of an author's writings when these are not available. Attempts to match available works with entries in these lists are similarly hazardous, even more so in the case of Rngog Lo, where there is no available pair of works on the same Indian treatise bearing the respective titles *don bsdus* and *rnam bshad*.

The following cases illustrate well the kind of problems one runs into when taking these lists literally:

a) In the case of Rngog Lo's writings on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, Gro lung pa lists the pair *don bsdus/rnam bshad*, and two works are available, entitled *bsdus don* (the synoptic table) and *don bsdus* (the longer explanation). As pointed out by Kano (2008: 147), one possibility is that Gro lung pa's pair corresponds to the two available works, namely, Gro lung pa's "*don bsdus*" refers to the available *don bsdus*-synoptic table, and his "*rnam bshad*" to the available *don bsdus*-longer explanation. There would then be a terminological clash. To avoid this mismatch, one may also suggest that one of the two available texts is Gro lung pa's "*don bsdus*" (but which one?) and that the other is not listed by Gro lung pa; there

²⁶ Kano (2008: 129, n. 6) gives the title of the work as *Bcom ldan 'das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i snying po rgya cher bshad pa* and associates it with Gro lung pa's *rnam bshad* entry. However, although the colophon in the *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum* identifies the work as *shes rab snying po'i rgya cher 'grel gi bshad pa*, the introduction of the text reads: *shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i snying po rgya cher bshad pa 'di don bsdus pa ni rnam pa bzhi ste /...* This four-folio text is thus better identified as a *don bsdus pa* on the *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayaṭīkā*.

²⁷ See the footnotes to the list in Kano 2008: 128-33.

would thus be a third text, yet to be recovered, that corresponds to Gro lung pa's "*rnam bshad*".

b) Regarding Rngog Lo's writings on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, only one text is available, the *Dka' gnas rnam bshad*. Gro lung pa lists the pair *bsdus don/rnam bshad chen po*, Bu ston the pair *don bsdus/rnam bshad chen po*. Śākya mchog ldan follows Bu ston in one of his lists, but elsewhere speaks of a *ṭik chen* and a *dka' 'grel*. And when citing Rngog Lo, he identifies his sources as the *rnam par nges pa'i ṭika* and the *rnam par nges pa'i rnam bshad*.²⁸ His mention of a *dka' 'grel* hints to the type of work *Dka' gnas* is representative of. As discussed above (n. 11), his citations from the *rnam par nges pa'i rnam bshad* could be taken from the *Dka' gnas*, but possibly also from another work of Rngog Lo that has some passages in common with it. Thus it is unclear whether he knew two or three works by Rngog Lo on the PVin (or more), and which of these he refers to with the terms *don bsdus/rnam bshad chen po*. We have no way either to decide whether Gro lung pa meant to include the *Dka' gnas* in his list, and if so under which denomination.²⁹

Is the work under consideration in this paper listed by Gro lung pa? Gro lung pa lists a *bsdus don* and a *rnam bshad* on the *Nyāyabindu cum ṭikā (rigs thigs 'grel pa dang bcas pa)*. Should this refer to our text, it would be a description and not a title (because our text does not have a title) and an inexact description because, as I explain below, this text does not comment on the *Nyāyabindu* while taking into account Dharmottara's interpretation (in the way the *Dka' gnas* comments on the PVin cum PVinṭ) but bears directly on the *Nyāyabinduṭikā*. Its form is not that of a synoptic table. It is analogous to other more extensive commentaries of Rngog Lo entitled *don bsdus pa*. But since we have no evidence allowing us to appreciate the difference between a *don bsdus pa* and a *rnam bshad* on the basis of the available corpus, I refrain to match the concise guide with either of Gro lung pa's entries, or to reconstruct its title accordingly. All we can infer from Gro lung pa's list is that there may have been more than one work by Rngog Lo bearing on the NB/NBṭ. I thus use the expression "concise guide" without implying that it translates a given Tibetan term, and adopt the bibliographical abbreviation *Rigs thigs 'grel ṭi ka* purely for convenience's sake.

1.4 The *Nyāyabindu* and *Nyāyabinduṭikā* in Tibet

We can qualify the place of the text under consideration among Rngog Lo's epistemological writing as being related to an Indian treatise whose translation Rngog Lo revised, which

²⁸ See Hugon 2008: 20-2 for the references.

²⁹ We can note also the reference, by the author of the *Tshad bsdus*, to a "Small commentary" written (*bris*) by Rngog Lo (*Tshad bsdus* 139, 11). The passage quoted is not a literal citation of the *Dka' gnas*.

belongs to the category of "Dharmakīrti's principal works with a commentary." What was the import of the relevant Indian source text in Tibet?

The popularity of the NB in the period of the Early Diffusion (*snga dar*) of Buddhism in Tibet is attested by its early translation into Tibetan. The Lhan kar ma catalogue and the 'Phang thang ma catalogue both mention it among the works already translated at the time of Khri srong lde btsan, along with Dharmottara's NBT (translated by Dharmāloka and Jñānagarbha), Vinītadeva's commentary (translated by Jinamitra and Ye shes sde), and Kamalaśīla's *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasankṣipta* (translated by Viśuddhasiṃha and Dpal brtsegs Rakṣita).³⁰ The short versified *Nyāyabindupiṅḍārtha* by Jinamitra—who could have been the same Jinamitra as the translator of Vinītadeva's commentary—was also translated by Surendrabodhi and Ye shes sde, hence at the beginning of the 9th c. Autochthonous works on the NB were already composed at this time and the popularity of this treatise is further attested by its broad diffusion across the Tibetan empire, as fragments of a Tibetan translation found in Dunhuang testify.³¹

This popularity is easily understandable: the NB is short (much shorter than the PVin) but still presents a large scope of the author's thought (unlike, for instance, the more specialized *Sambandhaparīkṣā* or *Hetubindu*)—hence its classification by Tibetans among the three "principal works". It constitutes a good introductory work to the main aspects of Dharmakīrti's views regarding valid cognition, perception, inference, and proof. The author's ideas are presented in a straightforward way, without dealing with the refutation of opposite positions. Also, its style of composition is more readable than the PV's verses, which can hardly be understood without a commentary. As such, it is not surprising that it was among the first epistemological works to be translated into Tibetan, and received a considerable amount of attention.³²

This interest lasted up to the beginning of the Later Diffusion, but not much later. According to a list provided by Bu ston, the NB, together with the NBT and Kamalaśīla's

30 The Lhan kar ma catalogue gives two separate entries: *Rigs pa'i thigs pa'i phyogs snga ma* in 100 śloka translated by Dpal brtsegs (no. 700), and *Rigs pa'i thigs pa'i phyogs snga ma bsdu pa* in 150 śloka translated by Dpal brtsegs and Viśuddhasiṃha (no. 701). Cf. Lalou 1953: 336 and Herrmann-Pfandt 2008: 389-90.

31 See van der Kuijp 1989: 8-9 and Lasic 2007: 486. The two indigenous works listed in Bu ston's catalogue turn out to be listed also in the 'Phang thang ma catalogue under the titles *Na ya bin dhu'i brjed byang* and *Na ya bin dhu'i skabs kyi brjed byang*. "*Brjed byang*" usually indicates a type of mnemonic notes on a text.

32 Lasic (2007: 492) observes the predominance of texts and fragments relative to the NB and Dharmottara and Vinītadeva's commentaries thereon among the epistemological texts preserved at Tabo monastery, and suggests that the focus of scholars in this region in the field "can be considered a direct continuation of those preferences of study we see in the ancient period." But it is not known whether this material was used by scholars at the time of the Later Diffusion or earlier. In his 2006: 77, Lasic notes that "The question of how and when the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* manuscripts or their antecedents came to Tabo is, at least at the moment, impossible to answer."

Pūrvapakṣasaṅkṣipta, continued to be studied in the Rngog tradition up to the 14th c. (Jackson 1987: 147, n. 5). But one may wonder about the actual amount of interest for these texts in a period which is characterized by the predominance of the study of the PVin and PVinT, followed by a switch to the study of the PV after Sa skya Paṇḍita (van der Kuijp 1989: 13). Apart from Rngog Lo's concise guide, there is no evidence of the NB/NBT being the object of indigenous exegesis in the early centuries of the Later Diffusion.³³ In the generations that follow Rngog Lo, the PVin (*cum* PVinT) is the main (if not exclusive) work of epistemology that is commented upon and constitutes the background for independent compositions. There is no evidence that Tibetan scholars composed commentarial works on other treatises by Dharmakīrti, even less on commentaries or individual works by Dharmakīrti's exegetes. In particular, the only known work relating to the NB post-dating Rngog Lo's composition is the commentary composed three centuries later by Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432), the *Tshad ma rigs thigs kyi 'grel pa legs bshad snying pa'i gter*. Still, one finds occasional references to the NB, notably in the epistemological works of Chu mig pa³⁴ and in the *Tshad bsdus*.³⁵ They are given mainly when a specific definition is adduced from the NB, or when the NB offers a typology or numerical determination that differs from the PVin.

Rngog Lo's concise guide of the NBT appears as one of the last signs of interests in the NB as a whole before the PVin becomes the focus of attention. But one can even wonder whether Rngog Lo had any interest in the NB *per se*.³⁶ Indeed, unlike in the *Dka' gnas*, where the PVin stands as the source text for the explanation of which Dharmottara's interpretation is taken into consideration, in the concise guide it is Dharmottara's text that stands as the source text to be introduced and explained by Rngog Lo. Rngog Lo hardly refers to the NB itself, except when discussing the scope of perception. There he cites and explains six sentences of the NB when dealing with the "meaning of the root [-text]" (*rtsa ba'i don*).³⁷

33 Van der Kuijp (1994: 4) notes the existence in the Tibetan library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities in Beijing of an incomplete manuscript of the Tibetan translation of the *Nyāyabindu* containing many glosses by an unidentified hand—a sign that some Tibetan scholar(s) took interest in the text—but its date and the origin of the glosses is not established.

34 He mentions it when presenting unestablished reasons due to contradiction (*Rnam rgyal* 47a7: *'gal nas ma grub pa gsum po de rigs thigs nas bshad do*) and cites NB 2.42 regarding the number of logical reasons qua non-apprehension.

35 See for instance *Tshad bsdus* 149, 163, 169, 176, 182, 244, 246, 281.

36 As noted above (cf. n. 15), it is questionable whether Rngog Lo translated/revised the NB.

37 He also cites the first four of these sentences in another section, but only deals with Dharmottara's commentary on them (... *zhes bya ba'i rtsa ba'i tshig 'di 'chad pa'i 'grel pa'i gzhung*; ... *zhes bya ba'i rtsa ba'i tshig 'di bshad pa'i gzhung*).

In my opinion, Rngog Lo's concise guide is indicative of his specific interest in Dharmottara's thought rather than of an interest for the NB. This is corroborated by his translation and commentary on individual works of Dharmottara and portions thereof.

2. The Circumstances of the Composition of the Concise Guide

Under what circumstances did Rngog Lo compose his concise guide to the NBT? One can think of the following possibilities: (1) while studying the text at the time of his studies in Kashmir (1076-1092); (2) while revising the NB with Parahitabhadrā (if one follows the colophon to the Peking edition and other sources); (3) while revising the translation of the NBT with the Indian or Nepalese master Sumatikīrti at the time he was back in Tibet (ca. 1092–1109)³⁸; (4) when teaching the text in Tibet.

The first option is not very likely. Indeed the concise guide does not stand as the work of a beginner in the field taking notes when studying a text. It is rather a mature work by someone who not only has already mastered the material at hand, but also has his personal opinion about the issues discussed in the text. The amount of polemical passages, excursuses, and the use of terminology and categories suggesting an established background all speak against a work of youth.

The second option is also not very likely, because the passages of the NBT that are cited in the concise guide show that a revision of the translation of the NBT had already been carried out, or was being carried out. The concise guide must therefore have been composed when revising the NBT (3) or subsequently.

The Concise Guide and the *Dka' gnas*

What is its relation to the *Dka' gnas*? Since the *Dka' gnas* refers to an established translation of the PVin, its composition must postdate Rngog Lo's involvement in the translation of this work and of the PVinT, which was carried out (probably simultaneously) with Parahitabhadrā and others at the time of his stay in Kashmir. The complexity of Rngog Lo's

³⁸ Cf. Kramer 2007: 42, 59, n. 58 and 67.

argumentation in the *Dka' gnas*, like in the concise guide, speaks against a work of youth.³⁹ It is difficult to ascertain whether its composition preceded Rngog Lo's return to Tibet. The biography of Rngog Lo is not specific enough to help us decide conclusively whether all the works he composed were composed after he returned from his stay in Kashmir. We may attempt to trace the voice of non-Indian opponents in his works. This is not easy, because Rngog Lo rarely identifies the authors of objections, and many of them might just be hypothetical; also we do not know much about the "old epistemology" and Rngog Lo's relation to it.⁴⁰

Can we establish whether the concise guide post-dates the *Dka' gnas*, or vice versa? The two works have many parallel passages. This is due to the fact that the NB and the PVin address a number of common topics. The NB, which Frauwallner (1954: 151-152) situates as a later work by Dharmakīrti than the PVin, even re-uses passages from the PVin. Not surprisingly, Dharmottara's commentary on both texts also repeats itself to a large extent. Rngog Lo thus ends up carrying parallel discussions in the *Dka' gnas* and the concise guide to the NBT. The discussions in the concise guide tend to be more succinct than in the *Dka' gnas*. A specific case where this can be noticed are cases where the *Dka' gnas* presents Dharmottara's view and refutes it, whereas in the concise guide one only finds Dharmottara's view without explicit criticism. I do not deem it likely that Rngog Lo developed his criticism of Dharmottara on these specific points later on in his career, and that it is a sign that the *Dka' gnas* is a later work. I think rather that Rngog Lo willingly omits his criticism of Dharmottara on these points in the concise guide because the main object of the text is to explain Dharmottara's work. Rngog Lo is thus in the first place an exegete of Dharmottara in the concise guide, whereas in the *Dka' gnas*, his position is that of a competing interpreter of Dharmottara with regard to Dharmakīrti's text. That the concise guide is in general briefer than the *Dka' gnas* does not necessarily mean either that it is an abbreviated version of the latter, and thus post-dates it.

Strikingly, the phrasing of the two works is almost never literally identical in spite of the correspondence in the ideas expressed. I say "strikingly," because the literal re-use of textual material is a common practice in Tibetan literature: authors include in their

39 Van der Kuijp (2003: 399) writes: "A work of unmitigated genius, Rngog Lo tsā ba's PVIN study is extremely intriguing and stands virtually at the very beginning of the Tibetan enculturation of Indian Buddhist pramāṇavāda. At the same time, it leaves one with a strong impression of having a maturity of conception that is more ordinarily associated with a culmination of something."

40 We may wonder whether such discussions might also reflect disputes among Tibetan members of the translation team who may have surrounded Rngog Lo in Kashmir. The composition of the translation team is uncertain. In addition to Parahitabhadra and Rngog Lo, the colophon of the Tibetan translation of the PVin mentions "others" (*la sogs pa*), but this mention is attached to Parahitabhadra (*paṇḍita gzhan la phan pa bzang po la sogs pa dang / bod kyj lo tsā ba blo ldan shes rab*), suggesting additional Indian/Kashmirian members rather than other Tibetans.

works whole portions of previous compositions without acknowledging their foreign origin.⁴¹ Authors also reuse their own textual material in different works. My analysis of Śākya mchog ldan's quotations of Rngog Lo showed, as discussed above, that Rngog Lo most probably also followed this practice. But there is no evidence of literal text re-use between the *Dka' gnas* and the concise guide. Why would Rngog Lo completely change the phrasing of every sentence when discussing the exact same topic, especially in a scholarly context where literal text reuse appears to be a perfectly acceptable practice? It does not appear that the phrasing is systematically better in one of the two works—which would suggest rephrasing in view of improving the presentation. It may be the case that Rngog Lo composed the second work without referring to a written version of the first—he thus remembered the line of presentation and argumentation, but not the exact wording he had used previously. In such a case, it would be plausible that a significant time elapsed before the composition of the second work. Another tempting way to explain this phenomenon is to postulate that the two works we have were not composed in writing by Rngog Lo, but are representative of expositions carried out orally and noted down by students.

But this leads to a further question: did Rngog Lo's teaching of each text also vary at each exposition? Are there accordingly several competing written versions, only one of which is now available to us? Or did one version of his teaching, once written down, become the "standard text"?⁴²

The colophon of one of the *Dka' gnas manuscript reads shag kya'i dge slong 'dar rin chen 'byar gyis sbyin par bya ba'i chos so*.⁴³ Van der Kuijp (1994: 6-7) interpreted this phrase in the sense "A text/teaching to be given by the Śākya monk 'Dar Rin chen 'bar." I adopted this understanding also when discussing the colophon of the manuscript of Phya pa's *Rnam nges bsdus don* (a topical outline of the PVin), which has a similar expression naming the learned monk *Rdo rje dbang grags*.⁴⁴ Rather than a teaching to be given, it is more likely that the expression refers to a "dharma-gift" (*sbyin par bya ba'i chos*, *Skt. deyadharmā*) by the Buddhist monk 'Dar rin chen 'bar, respectively by the learned monk

41 On this practice in the composition of early epistemological works see Hugon (forthcoming).

42 The text in the two available manuscripts of the *Dka' gnas* is regular enough to qualify as "the same text." A more extensive comparison of the two manuscripts would be necessary to ascertain whether all variations can be explained by invoking the agency of the scribe or intruding glosses.

43 The last folios of the other manuscript are missing, so no colophon is available.

44 *Mang du thos pa'i dge slong rdo rje dbang grags kyis sbyin par bya ba'i chos s.hyo //*. See Hugon 2009: 69.

Rdo rje dbang grags.⁴⁵ Did these monks sponsor these particular manuscript-copies of the text? Or did they donate money in order to have a written version of the text produced on the basis of Rngog Lo's oral teaching? These various questions remain unanswered for now.

The date of composition of the concise guide cannot at present be established more specifically than by invoking the revision of the translation of the NBT as *terminus post quem*, hence probably the time where Rngog Lo was back in Tibet and working with Sumatikīrti. Its purpose is clearer: it is evident from its form that its primary purpose was to introduce Tibetan students to the contents of the NBT. It is a tool for teaching the NBT rather than a mere by-product of translation/revision. The internal organization of the work is indicative of its pedagogical function as a help to access an Indian treatise based on a given Tibetan translation (here, Rngog Lo's translation): the concise guide follows the NBT linearly and refers to the portions of the text under discussion by citing the first (and/or last) words of the Tibetan translation. It also provides a structural analysis of the work studied: the portions of the source text are hierarchized by means of *sa bcad* divisions. On the exegetical side, it helps the student to grasp the main ideas—these are rephrased, paraphrased and explained—but also to relate them to connected topics and to explore various interpretative options.

3. The popularity of the concise guide

How does one ascertain the popularity of a work? One may invoke the number of copies made of the work, its place in the monastic curriculum or in scholars' individual training,

45 There are several occurrences of this expression in colophons of texts in the *Bstan 'gyur*, notably:

1) At the end of the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* of Jñānaśrībhadrā. Someone named "Khyung po mtshan bzhi khams zla hor thug/phrug" is credited with providing (*nye bar sbyar*) dharma-gifts (in the plural), following which texts (manuscripts ?) were compared, the commentary composed, and translated (D4228/P5728: *gnas brtan mkhas pa chen po dzyāna shrī bha dra dang / lo tsā ba dge slong chos kyi brtson 'grus kyis bsgyur / khyung po mtshan bzhi khams zla hor phrug gis sbyin par bya ba'i chos rnam*. *nye bar sbyar zhing gsol ba btan nas / gzhung nye bar sbyar te brtsams nas bsgyur ba lags so //*). I ignore if this Khyung po is clantically related to the translator of the work, Khyung po Brtson 'grus (according to the Deb sngon the latter was one of the Tibetans who went to Kashmir together with Rngog Lo and others in 1076 [cf. Kramer 2007: 38, n. 34]).

2) At the end of the *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya* (*Mdo kun las btus pa chen po*, D3961): *sbyin par bya ba'i chos 'di ni rab mchog theg pa chen po'i rjes su 'brang ba shākya'i gnas brtan mkhas ba chen po dpal mar me mdzad ye shes kyi yin no //... de lta bu'i rgya gar gyi phyag dpe las bod kyi yi ger bsgyur ba'i sbyin par bya ba'i chos 'di ni rab mchog theg pa chen po'i rjes su 'brang ba shākya'i gnas brtan mkhas pa chen po yon tan grags kyi thugs dam yin no //* (compilation of the Sde dge and Peking reading as given in Dan Martin's *Tibskrit Philology*, March 10, 2006 version; the second mention of the expression occurs in a passage omitted in the Sde dge version).

or the amount of citations or re-use of passages in later works. In the case of the *Dka' gnas*, multiple interlinear annotations with at least two different handwritings in the *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum* manuscript indicate that this written expression of Rngog Lo's teaching was used for study, either by scholars individually, or more likely by students attending Rngog Lo or someone else's teaching based on this text.⁴⁶ But the only available manuscript of the concise guide does not contain many annotations. Most insertions qualify as corrections. Only on the first folio does one find several insertions (among which a quite long one) that appear to be notes by a reader/student rather than later additions of passages forgotten by the scribe. Is it a sign that the individual reader or the student only covered the first folio of the text?⁴⁷

The popularity that the concise guide may have achieved is debatable in view of the other criteria listed above as well. It may have had some impact in the circle of Rngog Lo's immediate disciples, but it is likely that its circulation and study did not carry on after Rngog Lo's passing. The concise guide is not (so far I could establish) quoted or even mentioned as a source by later authors, either in epistemological or historiographical works.⁴⁸ The significant excursions found in this work—such as the extensive discussion on the eulogy verse and elements of his discussion on the purpose of composition of the treatise—do not find an echo either. One can also note for instance that Rngog Lo's successors adopt a threefold subdivision of the mental state of presumption (*vid dpyod*), as mentioned in the *Dka' gnas*, but that none of them refers to the fourfold subdivision mentioned in the concise guide (see Part II, §3.3.2).

As mentioned in §1.4, starting already with Rngog Lo's successors, there was, in the early period up to the 13th c., not much interest in works other than the PVin *cum* PVinṭ. Rngog Lo's works on the PVin most likely remained in circulation for some generations. We find notably literal repeats of passages from the *Dka' gnas* (or another work of Rngog Lo on the PVin with identical portions) in Phya pa's commentary on the PVin. But it is probable that Rngog Lo's other epistemological works did not have the same impact. Such an observation, however, remains highly hypothetical since, at the exception of the concise guide, we have no access to the contents of these works.

In terms of the amount of citations and intellectual impact, we must concede that the

46 Most notes provide a help for reading the text, identifying the referents of pronouns or of ordinal number in lists, sometimes adding an illustration or completing an expression. I have not seen so far a note criticizing Rngog Lo's idea, or developing an alternative interpretation on some point.

47 I made the same remark in the case of Phya pa's *Rnam nges bsdus don* manuscript, which contains many annotations that tend to become rarer and rarer towards the end of the text (see Hugon 2009).

48 One cannot exclude references in the form of paraphrases by authors who mention Rngog Lo's views. But I have not met so far with literal citations or identification of this work as the source of a quotation.

concise guide is not to be classified among the key influential works in the Tibetan tradition. However, it is a precious testimony of the form of epistemological compositions in this period, a form representative of an effort to provide a facilitated access to a huge corpus of Indian literature that reaches Tibet simultaneously. It is also a precious testimony of Rngog Lo's style of exegesis, of his understanding of Dharmottara's thought, and to some extent of his own ideas. As I will show in the second part of this paper, this early work also gives us a glimpse into the very genesis of a genuinely "Tibetan" epistemological system. Namely, a system that is not reduced to the transposition of Indian epistemology in the Tibetan language, but reflects an appropriation of the Indian material, which is reframed by ways of conceptual categories and associated terminology developed by Tibetan scholars. Works such as the concise guide do not only allow us to observe the application of these new categories and terms when explaining a text, they hint to the very process that brought about these categories and terms in the first place. Let us thus turn now to the examination of this phenomenon, taking as a case-study the fivefold typology of invalid cognitions.

Part II. Tracing the Genesis of Tibetan Categories

Although the Tibetan tradition of epistemology emerged on the background of the Indian tradition, Tibetan thinkers developed their own interpretations and elaborated epistemological systems including elements—concepts, typologies, terms, etc.—that do not have a recognizable equivalent in extant Indian works. While modern scholars would be prone to pray such "originality," this is not something that equally was unanimously valued within the Tibetan tradition. Some traditional Tibetan scholars would rather derogatorily qualify such elements as "inventions," in the same way as they speak of "self-fabricated" (*rang bzo*) texts, practices and ideas that do not strictly reflect the Indian tradition.⁴⁹ Each of these original elements is of course to be considered individually, but it turns out that many of them are not creations "out of the blue" but consist rather in innovative arrangements based on elements that pre-exist in Indian literature. Steinkellner (1992) and Krasser (1997) have dealt with an instance of this phenomenon in the case of Tibetan discussions on the ascertainment of validity. I have discussed how the famous Tibetan threefold typology of objects stemmed from Dharmottara's discussion on valid cognition (Hugon 2008: 141),

49 Śākya mchog ldan's summary of Sa skya Paṇḍita's argument against the fivefold typology of invalid cognitions notably puts to the fore the absence of grounding in the fundamental (Indian) works for this numerical determination (*grangs nges gzhung nas ma bshad*) even before invoking contradiction with "the commentary" (i.e., PV) (*grel pa dang gal ba*) (translated in van der Kuijp 1978: 359).

how the Tibetan theory of definition has a footing in Dharmottara's notion of definitional inference (Hugon 2009[2010]), and how Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's new definition of valid cognition draws from Śāṅkaranandana's works (Hugon 2011). In cases such as the threefold typology of objects, it is apparent that the intention of the "inventor" is not to innovate, but to capture the core idea of some discussion, which he paraphrases and systematizes. There is of course a side-effect involved, as this systematization opens the door to applications that may—and often do—exceed the explicit expression of the original text.

While it is one thing to identify the Indian works that constituted potential sources of inspiration for Tibetan scholars (the terminology is helpful in this regard when Tibetans use reflexes of Sanskrit expressions), it is another to understand the process that took place, in which Indian elements were appropriated and re-framed into something that qualifies as "typically Tibetan". Such a process is not always patent, often due to unavailable sources and "missing links" in the material available to us. In the case of the Tibetan fivefold typology of invalid cognitions, to which I will now turn, we have the opportunity to get closer to tracing the elaborative steps which, I will argue, are closely related to the commentarial method adopted in works such as the concise guide.⁵⁰

1. The Fivefold Typology of Invalid Cognitions

The fivefold typology of invalid cognitions is one of the first original features of early Tibetan epistemology that was pointed out in modern scholarship. In his pioneering article on Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, van der Kuijp (1978) discusses this typology (the elements of which he terms "invalid cognitive acts") on the basis of later sources: Śākyā mchog ldan's (1428-1507) mention in his history of the development of epistemology in Tibet and of Go rams pa's (1429-1489) account in his commentary to the second chapter of Sa skya Paṇḍita's *Rigs gter*. Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182-1251) indeed criticizes this typology (as such, as well as some of its individual elements), which he attributes to "most Tibetans" (*Rigs gter* 2, p. 58: *bod phal cher*). The evidence we now have from authors predating Sa skya Paṇḍita shows that it was indeed commonly adopted, but with frequent

⁵⁰ In his 2012 paper, Nishizawa addresses the question of the origins of the typology of non-valid cognitions. He traces Indian precedents (both for the terminology and the concepts themselves) and points out passages of Dharmottara's works likely to have inspired Rngog Lo—these are also the ones I have identified and will be discussing here. Since Nishizawa does not take the relevant passage of the concise guide into consideration (he only mentions the passage on the various kinds of presumption [*vid dpyod*]) and does not elaborate on the actual process of appropriation, I trust that my discussion in this article will be of interest even for readers already familiar with Nishizawa's paper.

variations as to the definition of each member.⁵¹ The fivefold typology found its way into manuals of logic used notably in the Dge lugs pa monastic curriculum and is an inherent part of its so-called *blo rigs* manuals.⁵² Sa skya Paṇḍita's criticism caused it to be rejected by scholars adhering to the tradition of the *Rigs gter*, who followed instead the typology prescribed in this work.⁵³

Go rams pa identifies the proponent of the view criticized in the *Rigs gter* as "Phya pa, etc." But let us note that the terminology and examples in Go rams pa's presentation differ from what is found in Phya pa's available texts.⁵⁴ Phya pa is not the first Tibetan scholar who employed this typology. It is already attested in the two extant epistemological works by Rngog Lo.⁵⁵ These two works give us nothing like the systematic and quite detailed presentation found in Phya pa's works, where each category is defined and exemplified, and alternative explanations are refuted. Both the concise guide and the *Dka' gnas* introduce the typology in the same context: after establishing the definiens of valid cognition, in order to show that this definiens is not over-extensive, namely, does not apply to instances of cognition that are not recognized as valid. But the discussion takes a different form in each work, due in part to the difference of the source texts taken as the focus of presentation. Let us first consider the *Dka' gnas*, where we find the most explicit expression of a fivefold typology of invalid cognitions in terms of *tshad ma ma yin pa'i blo lnga po*.

51 See Hugon 2011: 173 for an example in the case of "undetermined appearance" (*snang la ma nges pa*).

52 On this literary genre, see the introduction of Rinpochoy and Napper 1980 and the remarks in van der Kuijp 1985: 36–7 on the term *blo rigs*. As van der Kuijp argues, the translation of this term as "awareness and knowledge" is misleading. "*Rigs*" in *blo rigs* (and not *blo rig*) denotes rather the "kinds" of instances of mind like in its counterpart *rtags rigs*. The expression "*rtags kyi rigs*" is attested in the sense "the kinds of logical reasons" in Phya pa's *Mun sel* 76b8, 77a2, but I have not so far traced an expression such as "*blo kyi rigs*." Phya pa refers to the typology in terms of "*blo tsam gyi dbye ba*."

53 See van der Kuijp 2009.

54 For instance, Go rams pa uses the expression *bcad shes* to refer to a cognition whose object has already been ascertained, whereas Phya pa always speaks of *bcad pa'i yul can*. Rngog Lo and Gtsang nag pa also use *bcad pa'i yul can*. Mtshur ston lists *bcad pa'i yul can* when enumerating the five invalid cognitions, but also uses the term *bcad shes* in this context. Sa skya Paṇḍita uses both *bcad shes* and *bcad pa'i yul can*, with a marked preference for the former. Chu mig pa only uses *bcas shes*. The description of the three kinds of presumptions (*vid dpyod*) is also related by Go rams pa in terms different from those of Phya pa's works, but closer to what is found in Gtsang nag pa's *Bsdus pa* 23a6ff. The various definitions also differ in their phrasing from those in Phya pa's texts. One may invoke a phenomenon of paraphrasing, but my guess is that Go rams pa is referring to some version of the typology known to him rather than rephrasing what stands in Phya pa's writings. He might not even have had access to the latter.

55 Van der Kuijp (2003: 398) was the first to point out that this typology could be traced back to Rngog Lo's *Dka' gnas*. He gives an outline of this passage in his 2009: 219. I also pointed out this passage of the *Dka' gnas*, along with the relevant passage of the concise guide in my 2008: 32-3, n. 62.

2. The Fivefold Typology in the *Dka' gnas*

The relevant passage of the *Dka' gnas* focuses on a phrase that occurs at the beginning of the PVin:

One who engages in activity after having ascertained (*yongs su bcad nas, paricchidya*) by these two [means of valid cognition] is not deceived with regard to causal efficiency.⁵⁶

Rngog Lo discusses this phrase, which is adopted as a definiens of valid cognition, together with Dharmottara's interpretation. After dealing with the various elements of this definition and the criteria they delineate, Rngog Lo shows that cognitions accepted to be valid—perception and inference—do in fact fulfill these criteria (*Dka' gnas* 31,12-32,18). This way, he establishes that the definiens does not lack inclusivity. He then proceeds to show that this definiens is not overinclusive (*ha cang khyab pa*). To this aim he posits a pre-established set of five cognitions that are not recognized as valid and shows in what way each of them does not fulfill the criteria involved in the definiens. In particular, how they do not fulfill the criterion "ascertaining the object" (*don yongs su gcod byed*), or, as Rngog Lo specifies, the criterion of "conventional ascertainment of the object" (*tha snyad pa'i yongs su gcod byed*).⁵⁷

Thus, the five non-valid cognitions — undetermined appearance (*snang la ma nges pa*), [cognition] whose object has been discriminated (*bcad pa'i yul can*), wrong cognition (*log pa'i shes pa*), presumption (*vid dpyod*) and doubt (*the tshom*) — are not valid cognitions, because they are not conventional ascertainers. (Appendix 1, §I)⁵⁸

In the paragraphs that follow, Rngog Lo explains why each of these five does not fulfill this

56 PVin_{Tib} 1 30,17–18: *'di dag gis don yongs su bcad nas 'jug pa na don bya ba la bslu ba med pa'i phyir ro //* PVin_{Skt} 1 1,10: *na hy ābhyām arthaṃ paricchidya pravartamāno 'rthakriyāyām viśamvādyate /*

57 Rngog Lo indeed distinguishes "conventional ascertainment," which he relates to intensional determination (*zhen par byed pa*, Skt. *adhyavasāya*), from "ultimate ascertainment" consisting in "mere revealing" (*gsal pa tsam*) (*Dka' gnas* 31,10–12). The second certainly refers to Dharmakīrti's definition of valid cognition in terms of "revealing of an unknown object" (*ajñātārthaprakāśa, ma shes don gyi gsal byed*) in PV 2.5c.

58 If one follows the reading of *Dka' gnas* AA', one should translate: "Thus, the non-valid cognitions are five in number. This is because undetermined appearance, cognition whose object has been discriminated, wrong cognition, presumption and doubt are not conventional ascertainers."

criterion involved in the definiens of valid cognition:

II- The mental states termed "undetermined appearance" and "cognition whose object has been discriminated" do not qualify as "ascertainers" because they do not determine something that was not known previously. From the terminology used for these two kinds of invalid cognition, we can understand that the former does not determine (*nges pa*), and that the latter does not apply to something that is not yet known (*sngar ma rtogs pa*).⁵⁹

III- "Wrong cognition" (*log pa'i shes pa*) qualifies as "ascertainer" in general, but actually ascertains wrongly (*log par*). There is thus no "absence of deception" (a criterion also mentioned in the definiens).

IV- For "presumption" (*yid dpyod*) its inability to fulfill the criterion of "ascertainment" is explained by its having "the nature of the latter," i.e., as the notes in manuscript B specifies, of wrong cognition. This is not because presumption wrongly ascertains, but because it is not causally related with its object. A cognition of this sort may occur when the object is indeed existent, but also when the object is not existent.⁶⁰ Thus one cannot reject the option that such cognition is a wrong cognition whose object does not exist.⁶¹

V- The fifth invalid cognition, "doubt" (*the tshom*) does not ascertain because it does not eliminate. Here "ascertainment" (*yongs su gcod, pariccheda*) is assimilated to a "positive ascertainment" which involves a "negative ascertainment" (*rnam par gcod, vyavaccheda*) in the sense of the elimination of the opposite.

After this enumeration, Rngog Lo criticizes the way Dharmottara classifies invalid cognitions:

Master Dharmottara says: "Doubt amounts to wrong cognition, because it apprehends [its object] as having the nature of both something real and something unreal. The three kinds of presumption — without a ground, with a wrong ground, with a true but non-established ground — amount to the nature of doubt, and therefore they are wrong cognitions." This is clearly completely erroneous, because doubt does

⁵⁹ They still ultimately have the "action of intelligence" (*rig pa'i byed pa*), which is thus to be associated with the notion of "revealing" (cf. the preceding note).

⁶⁰ To take a well-known example of presumption, the source of which can be traced to the PVinT, the determination "there is water in the well" by someone who is in a house (i.e., has not looked into the well) may occur whether or not there is actually water in the well. In Rngog Lo's terms, it qualifies as a presumption if there is water in the well and as a wrong cognition if there is none. There is no means to distinguish the two on the basis of mental introspection alone. See Stoltz 2009 for a discussion of the philosophical consequences of the adoption of a system where such mental events are distinguished exclusively on the basis of an external state of affairs.

⁶¹ Rngog Lo gives the simile of vapor produced simultaneously with smoke. Its co-occurrence with fire is established, but not its absence in the absence of fire. Therefore one cannot eliminate the option that it is not an effect of fire.

not ascertain a nature that is both [real and unreal; indeed it does not ascertain anything]. (Appendix 1, §VI)

The quotation containing Dharmottara's view is not a literal citation of a work by Dharmottara. It must be understood as an account of Rngog Lo's understanding of Dharmottara's discussion in the PVinṬ.⁶² In particular, it should be clear that Dharmottara does not speak of "three kinds of presumption," but he does deal with a number of illustrations which Rngog Lo tags as such (see section 3.3.2).

Rngog Lo's refutation of Dharmottara's view relies on his divergent understanding of "doubt." Rngog Lo takes Dharmottara to say that doubt ascertains a dual nature (something that is both real and unreal), which is not something that actually exists, whereas he personally claims that doubt does not ascertain anything (cf. V).

Rngog Lo ends the discussion on his own classification of the five kinds of invalid cognitions into three overarching categories (VII):

- Absence of understanding (*ma rtogs*): undetermined appearance and cognition with a discriminated object;
- Wrong understanding (*log par rtog[s] pa*)⁶³: wrong cognition and presumption;
- Doubt (*the tshom*): doubt (not to be subsided under the second category).

3. The Concise Guide on the Fivefold Typology

Since the concise guide focuses on Dharmottara's NBT, the refutation of a putative over-extension of the definiens relies on the definiens supported by Dharmottara in this work. The NB itself does not formally state a definiens, but NB 1.1 has it that "the fulfillment of every human aim is preceded by correct cognition" (*samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhir*). In the NBT ad NB 1.1, Dharmottara identifies Dharmakīrti's mention of "correct cognition" (*samyagjñāna*) with "non-belying cognition" (NBṬ_{skt} 17,1: *avisamvādakam jñānam samyagjñānam*), thus relating it to the definition of valid cognition given by Dharmakīrti in the PV (2.1ab: *pramāṇam avisamvādī jñānam*). b Dharmottara has a personal

⁶² Cf. PVinṬ 1 D5b1–7, P6a1–8. As we will see this has a parallel in NBT; thus both qualify here as Rngog Lo's source of information. I leave to another occasion the discussion whether Rngog Lo is giving a fair representation of Dharmottara's thought, or is implying more than his texts say.

⁶³ The spellings *log rtog* and *log rtogs* are often confused and the latter predominates in manuscripts of the early period. In the *Dka' gnas* this expression follows *ma rtogs*, and in the concise guide it follows *yang dag par rtogs pa* and *ma rtogs pa*. It is thus possible that rNgog Lo wants to draw a contrast between "correct understanding" and the absence of understanding on the one hand, and "wrong understanding" on the other, rather than refer to "wrong notions" (as when he introduces opposite opinions to be refuted). I thus prefer to retain the original orthography *log rtogs*.

understanding of what being reliable (*saṃvādaka*) is about. Drawing an analogy with the mundane use of the word, he equates it with a person, by analogy, a cognition "making one obtain the object that it itself indicates" (*svayaṃ pradarśitam arthaṃ prāpayan*). Thus reliability is associated with "making one obtain" (*prāpakatva*, Tib. *thob par byed pa/phrad par byed pa*),⁶⁴ claimed to be identical with "inciting engagement" (*pravartakatva*, Tib. *'jug par byed pa*). The latter is also assimilated to "indicating the object of engagement" (*pravṛttiviśayapradarśakatva*, Tib. *'jug pa'i yul rab tu ston pa*).⁶⁵

In his concise guide, Rngog Lo organizes Dharmottara's long commentary on NB 1.1, and more specifically on the term *samyagjñāna*, according to the following structure (I list here only the main subdivisions):

	NBT _{Skt}
1. Definition	17,1-19,4
2. Rejecting faults of the definiens	20,1-23,2
2.1 The definiens does not lack pervasion	20,1-21,2
2.2 The definiens is not over-extensive	21,2-23,2
3. Rejecting wrong notions pertaining to the definition	23,2-26,4

According to Rngog Lo's structuring of the source text, in NBT_{Skt} 20,1-21,2 (=§2.1), Dharmottara shows that the definiens actually applies to perception and inference; in NBT_{Skt} 21,2-23,2 (=§2.2), that the definiens does not apply to other instances of cognition. Let us look more closely at the source text of §2.2, which Rngog Lo divides into four subsections, and at the explanations he provides for each of them.

3.1 The text of the NBT

I give below the Sanskrit text of the relevant passage as it appears in Malvania's edition. The Tibetan text is as it appears in Stcherbatsky's edition (7, 5-17), which corresponds to the version in the Peking *bstan 'gyur* (45b3–7) with one minor exception.⁶⁶ As Lasic (2006) discussed, the text of the NBT_{Tib} in the canonical collections is in very bad shape. Revisions were not carried out as intended by Rngog Lo and multiple corruptions crept into the text. Apart from the expression in bold character, which are cited in the concise guide as "markers," one should not assume that it represents word for word Rngog Lo's intended

⁶⁴ As I explain in my forthcoming introduction to the concise guide, I suspect that the second term reflects the older translation of the NBT by Dharmāloka and Jñānagarbha, and *thob par byed pa* Rngog Lo's revision, which was only partially carried out.

⁶⁵ For more details on Dharmottara's position based on his *Laghuprāmānyaparīkṣā*, see Krasser 1995.

⁶⁶ In §3 P has the reading *rtags med par rnam par rtogs pa*.

translation. It is given here only indicatively and without further attempt at critically editing it. The translation—based on the Sanskrit—is mine.⁶⁷

§1	<p>nānyad vijñānam / prāptum śakyam artham ādarśayat prāpakam / prāpakatvāc ca pramāṇam / ābhyām pramāṇābhyām anyena ca jñānena darśito 'rthaḥ kaścīd atyantaviparyastaḥ / yathā marīcikāsu jalam / sa cāsattvāt prāptum aśakyah /</p>	<p>rnam par shes pa gzhan ni ma yin te / thob par nus pa'i don ston pa ni thob par byed pa yin la / tshad ma yang thob par byed pa las yin na / tshad ma gnyis las gzhan pa'i shes pas bstan pa'i don ni smig rgyu la chu bzhin du kha cig shin tu phyin ci log pa yin la / de yang med pa'i phyir phrad par bya mi nus so //</p> <p>"But another cognition is not [valid]. What indicates an object that can be obtained is something that makes one obtain (<i>prāpaka</i>). And [a cognition is a] valid cognition because it is something that makes one obtain. In some cases⁶⁸ the object indicated by a cognition other than these two valid cognitions [i.e., perception and inference] is a complete delusion, just like water in the case of a mirage. And since [the object indicated by such a cognition] does not exist it cannot be obtained."</p>
§2	<p>kaścīd aniyato bhāvābhāvayoḥ / yathā saṃśayārthaḥ / na ca bhāvābhāvābhyām yukto 'rtho jagaty asti / tataḥ prāptum aśakyas tādṛśah /</p>	<p>kha cig ni yid gnyis kyī don bzhin du dngos po dang dngos po med pa ma nges pa yin la / dngos po dang dngos po med pa gnyi ga dang ldan pa'i don yang 'gro ba na yod pa ma yin pa de bas na de dang 'dra ba phrad par mi nus so //</p> <p>"In some cases it [i.e., the object indicated by a cognition other than these two] is not determined as being real or unreal, like the object of doubt (<i>saṃśaya</i>). And there does not exist in the world an object that is linked with both existence and non-existence. Therefore, such [an object] cannot be obtained."</p>

⁶⁷ Stecherbatsky's translation appears in his 1932, vol. 2, 6,6–7,7.

⁶⁸ I translate here with "in some cases" the expression *kaścīd* (*arthah*) repeated in the next paragraph, by which Dharmottara distinguishes two situations relatively to the object.

§3	sarveṇa cāliṅgena(/cāliṅgajena) vikalpena niyāmakam adṛṣṭvā pravṛttena bhāvābhāvayor aniyata evārtho darśayitavyaḥ / sa ca prāptum aśakyaḥ /	rtags med par rnam par rtog pa nges par ma mthong bar 'jug pa thams cad kyis bstan par bya ba'i don ni dngos po dang dngos po med pa dag tu ma nges pa kho na yin la / de yang thob par mi nus so //
"The object to be indicated by every conceptual cognition devoid of a logical reason(/ not born from a logical reason), that applies without a delineator [of existence or non-existence] being observed, ^① is just not determined to be real or unreal. And it cannot be obtained."		
§4	tasmād aśakyaprāpaṇam atyantaviparītam bhāvābhāvāniyataṃ cārthaṃ darśayad apramāṇam anyaj jñānam /	de bas na phrad par mi nus pa shin tu phyin ci log pa dang dngos po dang dngos po med pa ma nges pa'i don ston par byed pas shes pa gzhan ni tshad ma ma yin no //
"Therefore another cognition that indicates an object that cannot be obtained, either a complete delusion or [an object] not determined as real or unreal, is not a valid cognition."		

3.2 Rngog Lo's Explanation – Translation of the Concise Guide⁶⁹

Regarding the rejection of over-inclusion there are four points:

1. The rejection of over-inclusion of wrong cognition (*log pa'i shes pa*) [is explained by Dharmottara] in §1⁷⁰.

[The meaning of this passage is:] Incitation to engage (*jug par byed pa*, Skt. *pravarttaka*) is present for what indicates an object of engagement (*jug yul ston par byed pa*, Skt. *pravṛttiviśayapradarśaka/ °upadarśaka*). Wrong cognition does not indicate this [i.e., an object of engagement]. This is because since what is indicated by it does not exist, it is not fit to be an object of engagement.⁷¹

⁶⁹ For the Tibetan text see the Appendix 2.

⁷⁰ This refers to the number of the paragraph in the text of the NBT in section 3.1 of this paper. The text of the concise guide refers to these paragraphs by citing their first words as "markers." These words appear in bold in the Tibetan text in Appendix 2. The end of the intended paragraph is to be understood by looking at the words given to indicate the next paragraph.

⁷¹ This gives an interesting insight into the way Rngog Lo reformulates Dharmottara's ideas. In the present case, we may notice that Rngog Lo puts to the fore the criterion "indicating the object of engagement" whereas Dharmottara's text explicitly puts the emphasis on the criterion "the object can be obtained." Although Dharmottara holds both ideas to be equivalent, the criterion "indicating the object of engagement" was the focus of an earlier discussion (as Rngog Lo himself states when mentioning *snang la ma nges pa* and *bcad pa'i yul can* below).

2. Second, the rejection of over-inclusion of doubt (*yid gnyis*) [is explained by Dharmottara] in §2.

3. Third, rejection of the over-inclusion of presumption (*yid dpyod*) [is explained by Dharmottara] in §3.

Master Dharmottara's opinion is that the four kinds of presumption—without a ground, with a wrong ground, with a correct but non-established ground, with an established but forgotten ground—amount to doubt (*the tshom*), and that doubt also amounts to wrong cognition insofar it posits an object that is not existent, being both [entity and non-entity]. Cognition whose object has been discriminated (*bcad pa'i yul can*) and undetermined appearance (*snang la ma nges pa*) are not discussed here. This is because the analysis [of these cases] has been established previously when stating that the indication of an object of engagement is the function of valid cognition; indeed [these two cognitions] do not have the function of indicating the object of engagement.

4. Fourth, the recapitulation [is stated by Dharmottara] in §4.

I myself understand as follows:

There are four kinds of cognition (*shes pa*): correct understanding, non-understanding, wrong understanding and doubt.

Here, the first is valid cognition (*tshad ma*) because it is precisely a correct conventional understanding.

The second are undetermined appearance (*snang la ma nges pa*) and cognition whose been discriminated (*bcad pa'i yul can*), because they are devoid of the function of conventional understanding.

The third are all wrong cognitions (*log pa'i shes pa*), wrong in that they make one understand an object that is non-existent.

The fourth [namely, doubt (*the tshom*)] does not have the ability to engage the object, because without eliminating anything one does not ascertain (*yongs su gcod*, Skt. *pariccheda*) anything.

Every presumption (*yid dpyod*) amounts to a wrong cognition, because since [such cognition also] arises in the absence of the object, it is not devoid of the nature of being without an object. Just like for instance, since entities that exist simultaneously with smoke arise even when there is no fire, they are not devoid of the nature of not being an effect of fire.

3.3 Remarks on Rngog Lo's Explanation

3.3.1 Doubt

Rngog Lo outlines in subsections 1-3 three kinds of invalid cognitions: wrong cognition, doubt and presumption. Interestingly, the second kind, doubt, is termed here *yid gnyis*, whereas the *Dka' gnas* listed *the tshom*, which is the standard term for this category in

the later Tibetan tradition. The reason could be that he follows here the way the term is translated in the Tibetan version of the NBT.⁷²

3.3.2 Presumption

In the case of presumption (*vid dpyod*), Rngog Lo attributes to Dharmottara the distinction of four different kinds of presumption. Only three of them were listed in the view attributed to Dharmottara in *Dka' gnas* VI (namely, the first three, without the case with an established but forgotten ground). Rngog Lo is not explicit on whether he endorses this threefold or fourfold distinction, but his successors generally include a threefold distinction in their presentation of presumption. We can note that the NBT does not provide any support for this distinction in the corresponding paragraph. Rngog Lo is thus referring here to Dharmottara's discussion in the PVinT (D5b3–7), which offer a ground for this distinction and supports the terminology used by Rngog Lo for the different kinds.⁷³ Unlike in the *Dka' gnas*, Rngog Lo does not voice a direct criticism of Dharmottara's reduction of these cases to doubt, and of doubt to wrong cognition. His disagreement can however be apprehended in the way he presents his own position.

3.3.3 Undetermined appearance and cognition whose object has been discriminated

The additional two kinds of invalid cognition found in the fivefold list in the *Dka' gnas*—"undetermined appearance" (*snang la ma nges pa*) and "cognition whose object has been discriminated" (*bcad pa'i yul can*)—are mentioned in the concise guide after the first three subsections delineated in the NBT have been presented. Rngog Lo simply refers for these two cases to a previous discussion about the "indication of the object of engagement (*jug yul ston pa*, Skt. *pravṛttiviśayapradarśaka*) being the function of valid cognition." One can safely identify the passage of the NBT that Rngog Lo has in mind, even though the names of the two kinds of non-valid cognition are not mentioned on this occasion in the concise guide.⁷⁴ It occurs after Dharmottara has explained the connection between "indicating the

72 We may still wonder why Rngog Lo did not change this translation to *the tshom* when revising the text of this passage, as he appears to have done in other places in the NBT. I refer the reader to the introduction to my forthcoming edition of the concise guide for a detailed discussion on this terminological variation.

73 In this passage of the PVinT Dharmottara indeed enumerates two examples that amount to a doubtful cognition: the cognition "there is water in the well" when one is in the house; the determination of fire based on a swarm of flies. For the second example, he distinguishes the following cases: one takes the swarm of flies to be smoke without a reason; there is the joint perception of a swarm of flies and smoke without determining the nature of smoke as distinct from that of the swarm of flies; this distinction is determined, but not remembered at the time of inference; one does not remember the nature of smoke to be determined as the effect of fire.

74 I therefore do not supply here the Tibetan text and the translation of Rngog Lo's explanation of this section, where he focuses on the equivalence of the various elements mentioned by Dharmottara (indicating the object of engagement, inciting to engage, etc.), and distinguishes them in terms of action and result, and for the latter, of direct and indirect result.

object of engagement," "inciting to engage" and "obtaining the object" (NBT_{Skt} 17,2ff.). Dharmottara takes up another notion, that of "understanding the object" (*arthādhigati*) and restricts the latter to the initial understanding of the object (NBT_{Skt} 19,1–4; NBT_{Tib} Stcherbatsky's edition 6,–15=P45a5–8⁷⁵):

ata eva cārthādhigatir eva pramāṇaphalam / adhigate cārthe pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ prāpitaś cārthaḥ / tathā ca saty arthādhigamāt samāptaḥ pramāṇavyāpāraḥ /	de bas na don rtogs pa kho na tshad ma'i 'bras bu yin la / rtogs pa'i don la skyes bu bcug par gyur pa ni don dang phrad par 'gyur ba yang yin no // de ltar na don rtogs par gyur pa'i phyir tshad ma'i bya ba rdzogs pa yin no //
"Therefore, the result of valid cognition is precisely the understanding of the object. And it is when the object has been understood that the person is incited to act and that the object is obtained. Thus, this being the case, the role of valid cognition is fulfilled by the understanding of the object."	
ata eva cānadhigataviṣayaṃ pramāṇam / yenaiva hi jñānena prathamam adhigato 'rthaḥ / tenaiva pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ / prāpitaś cārthaḥ / tatraiva cātha ⁷⁶ kim anyena jñānēndhikam kāryam /	de bas na ma bcad pa'i yul can ni tshad ma yin te / shes pa gang gis thog ma nyid du don rtogs pa de nyid kyis skyes bu bcug par gyur cing don dang phrad par gyur pa yang yin te / don de kho na la ni shes pa gzhan gyis lhag par ci byar yang med do //
"Therefore, valid cognition has an object that has not yet been understood. A person is incited to act and an object is obtained by means of the very cognition by which the object is first understood. And with regard to this, then, what else would be achieved by another cognition?"	
ato 'dhigataviṣayaṃ apramāṇam /	de bas na bcad pa'i yul can ni tshad ma ma yin no //
"Therefore, [a cognition] whose object has already been understood is not a valid cognition."	

It is clear that according to Rngog Lo the mention of "the very cognition by which the object is first understood" eliminates from the range of valid cognitions those cognitions whose object has already been known, or according to the Tibetan expression "cognitions whose object has (already) been discriminated" (*bcad pa'i yul can*). The very Tibetan term used by Rngog Lo for this category of invalid cognition actually occurs in the translation of this passage, where it reflects the Sanskrit *adhigataviṣayaṃ*. The term *bcad pa* is used

⁷⁵ D37b6–38a1 has the same reading with some minor variations, such as 'gyur for gyur or vice versa.

⁷⁶ The translator may have read *tatraiva cārthe*, or might have added *don* as a gloss of *tatra*.

here in the same sense as *rtogs pa*, which also translates *adhigata* in this context. It is likely that this choice of translation is related to the criterion of "ascertainment" (*pariccheda*, Tib. *yongs su gcod pa*) discussed in the parallel context in the PVin/PVinT.

What about "undetermined appearance" (*snang la ma nges pa*)? We may surmise that this kind of invalid cognition is related to the condition expressed by Dharmottara in the first paragraph of the above passage, namely, that a valid cognition must understand (*adhigam*, *rtogs*) its object. "Undetermined appearances" are thus invalid because they do not understand their object (which is the function [*vyāpara*] and effect [*phala*] of valid cognition). This goes well with Rngog Lo's statement of his own view in the concise guide (and in the *Dka' gnas*, VII), where he classifies this type of invalid cognition, together with the preceding one, in the category of "non-understanding" (*ma rtogs pa*). In the concise guide, he explains that it is due to the "lack of the function of conventional understanding" (*tha snyad pa'i rtogs pa'i byed pa dang bral ba*). The notion of "conventional understanding" (*tha snyad pa'i rtogs pa*) echoes the notion of "conventional ascertainment" (*tha snyad pa'i yongs su gcod byed*) that was the criterion under consideration in the *Dka' gnas*. As mentioned (cf. n. 57), in this text Rngog Lo distinguishes "conventional ascertainment," which he relates to intensional determination (*zhen par byed pa*, Skt. *adhyavasāya*), from "ultimate ascertainment" consisting in "mere revealing" (*gsal pa tsam*).

We may thus gather from the terminology that for Rngog Lo undetermined appearances are cognitions in which something appears (*snang*)—i.e., they reveal (*gsal ba*) something, are the intelligence (*rig pa*) of something—but for which there is no determination (*nges pa*), here used in the sense of "intensional determination" (*zhen pa*). This "intensional determination" would correspond in Rngog Lo's view to what Dharmottara expresses in terms of "understanding" (*adhigama*, *rtogs pa*). Undetermined appearances are thus eliminated from the range of valid cognitions in this passage by Dharmottara's mention of "understanding an object" (*arthādhigati*, Tib. *don rtogs pa*).

4. The Constitution of the Fivefold Typology

On the basis of the two passages considered in section 2 and 3, we can appreciate the different approaches of both texts: In the *Dka' gnas*, we find a presentation of Rngog Lo's own view, supplemented by a short mention and criticism of Dharmottara's view; in the concise guide on the other hand we find a presentation of Dharmottara's text and of his views, and only as an appendix the presentation of Rngog Lo's own views.

In the *Dka' gnas*, the fivefold typology appears as a pre-established classification. This text does not help us understand how Rngog Lo came to use this exhaustive fivefold distinction for non-valid cognitions to discuss the topic. It only hints to the fact that there is a background discussion in Dharmottara where various cases of invalid cognition are

discussed. Rngog Lo does not cite here the original text, but presents Dharmottara's view using the terms of the fivefold typology, in particular: wrong cognition, doubt, presumption (with three subtypes). In the concise guide on the other hand, we can draw a closer link between Dharmottara's text and the fivefold typology:

The three sentences in the NBT that present situations where the cognition is not valid because the object cannot be obtained (cf. section 3.1) (the expression *prāptum aśakyaḥ* is repeated thrice by Dharmottara) can be identified as the source of a threefold distinction (regardless of whether they represent genuine distinct kinds of cognition or not). Note that while Dharmottara's discussion concentrates on the status of the object in these cases, Rngog Lo's analysis of these passages distinguishes types of cognition.

The passage of the NBT on the "understanding of an object" (cited in section 3.3) also enables a twofold distinction insofar as it simultaneously refers to a positive condition (there must be understanding of the object) and a restriction (this understanding must not have taken place already).

The link between these two passages of the NBT and Rngog Lo's typology suggests that we are not dealing with a typology pre-established independently of the text that is applied to analyze it⁷⁷, but that the typology was generated in the process of an analysis of the text itself, and was then retroactively applied to comment on the text.

If it is indeed on the basis of an analysis of the NBT that this typology was constituted, we may suppose that the wording of this text influenced the choice of the terminology.

This seems evident in the case of the cognition whose object is already discriminated (*bcad pa'i yul can*), where the expression appears as such in the Tibetan translation. The term "doubt" (*vid gnyis, the tshom*) also derives directly from the source text, as the "object of doubt" (*samśayārthah*) is mentioned to illustrate the case identified as such. But the identification of the source is not as clear for the other terms:

—For the case identified in terms of "wrong cognition" (*log pa'i shes pa*) Dharmottara's text does not give a name for the relevant cognition, but qualifies the object as *atyantaviparīta*, which is translated in Tibetan as *shin tu phyin ci log pa*. Other Sanskrit works elaborating on the distinction of invalid cognitions adopt the expression *viparyāsa* for this cognition.⁷⁸ The Tibetan *log pa* usually translates *mithyā*; *log pa'i shes pa* is attested for *mithyājñāna* five times in the translation of the NBT according to Obermiller's index. But according to the same index, *log pa* also sometimes translates *viparīta* or *viparyaya*. If Rngog Lo had a Sanskrit expression in mind when speaking of *log pa'i shes pa* (which is

⁷⁷ Like, for instance, if one analyses Tibetan theories on language by way of a Saussurian model.

⁷⁸ See the passages of *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* and *Tarkabhāṣa* cited in Nishizawa 2012: 107-08, n. 6 and 8, which speak, respectively of *viparyāsātmakam* and *viparyāśajñāna*.

plausible, but not obligatory), it could be related to *vīparīta*, and hence to the terminology used by Dharmottara to qualify the object in this case.

—The term *yid dpyod* is not found in the Tibetan translation of Dharmottara's works, nor so far I know in other translations of Sanskrit works.⁷⁹ As noted by Nishizawa (2012: 113, n. 23) Śākya mchog ldan explains the term etymologically as "conceptual mental analysis" (*yid rtog yin par gyur pa'i dpyod*). The term might well be a Tibetan terminological innovation. Its proximity with the term *yid gnyis* in the passage of the NBT under consideration might be of significance in this regard.⁸⁰

— The expression "*snang la ma nges pa*" is not linked with the terminology used in the NBT in the passage indicated by Rngog Lo. But a parallel passage in the PVinT_{Tib} discusses the function of valid cognition in terms that are more relevant. The Tibetan translation reads (PVinT(a) 15,7-12. Dashed underline delineates expressions for which a Sanskrit equivalent is tentatively proposed in parenthesis):

don thob par byed pa (*prāpakatvam/prāpayan) ni tshad ma yin la / de yang 'jug par byed pa nyid yin gyi gzhan ni ma yin no (*prāpakatvam, nānyat) // 'jug par byed pa yang 'jug pa'i yul ston pa nyid yin par (*pravartakatvam api pravṛttiviśayapradarśakatvam) brjod de / des na **snang ba nges par byas pa ni bstan pa yin pa'i phyir** 'jug pa'i yul la tshad ma'i bya ba yongs su rdzogs pa yin no (*samāptaḥ pramāṇavyāparah) //

The first sentences recall the equivalence also put forward in the NBT between "indicating the object," "inciting to act" and "making one obtain the object." The way the "function of valid cognition is fulfilled" (*samāptaḥ pramāṇavyāparah*) is linked in the NBT with the "understanding of the object" (NBT 19, 2: *arthādhigamāt samāptaḥ pramāṇavyāpārah*). Instead in the PVinT Dharmottara points out the "determined appearance being indicated" (*snang ba nges par byas pa ni bstan pa yin pa'i phyir*).⁸¹ While we can only guess what the original Sanskrit might have been, the Tibetan provides here a positive counterpart of *snang*

⁷⁹ The equivalent *manahparīkṣā* is provided in Candra Das's dictionary, but I do not know whether it is his own conjecture or whether it is attested in a Sanskrit work for which a Tibetan translation is available.

⁸⁰ A possible influence that would deserve further inquiry is the attribution by mTshur ston and Sa skya Paṅḍita (*Sgron ma* 54a6, *Rigs gter* 6.59ab, p. 165ff.) to Śāṅkaranandana of a method for establishing relations relying on "*dpyod pa*," a mental process distinct from valid cognition, which was apparently adopted by Rngog Lo (cf. *Dka' gnas* 256ff.), but is refuted from Phya pa onwards.

⁸¹ Steinkellner&Krasser 1989: 86: "Daher ist, weil das festgestellte Erscheinungsbild gezeigt ist, die Funktion der gültigen Erkenntnis mit Bezug auf das Handlungsobject völlig abgeschlossen."

*la ma nges pa.*⁸²

The relevant passages of the NBT pointed out in sections 3.1 and 3.3 are not immediately consecutive, nor do they support in themselves the terminology associated with the fivefold typology. There is thus more at play in the constitution of the fivefold typology than a linear reading of a single source text, even though such a text may have provided the starting point. In our case, various elements partially scattered in the NBT have been brought together and also cross-referenced with parallel passages in Dharmottara's PViT and maybe other less obvious sources.

Can we say that Rngog Lo, as a main actor in the translation/revision and exposition of this material, is the "inventor of the fivefold category"? One should not jump too quickly to this conclusion from the fact that his works provide us with the earliest available mention and use of this typology. We may want to leave open the possibility that Rngog Lo was influenced by some late Indian/Kashmirian commentary unknown to us, or by the Kashmiri masters under which he studied. Either way, the establishment of the fivefold typology of invalid cognition is thus not just "inspired" by Dharmottara's discussion. It results from a close reading of the texts that builds each case and example into a specific category. Once this is in place, thinkers can proceed to examine the relevance of the category on its own and its relation to other categories, both from the point of view of their own understanding and as exegetes presenting the view of another author. In the present case for instance, Rngog Lo subsumes the category of "presumption" singled out in §3 of the concise guide under wrong cognition in the presentation of his own view, and ascribes to Dharmottara the view that this category is subsumed under doubt.

Conclusion

In view of his life story and scholarly contribution, I would like to characterize Rngog Lo as a "first-generation scholar" in opposition to "later generation scholars": Rngog Lo spent eighteen years in Kashmir where he studied and worked closely with local scholars;

⁸² In the NBT, we find *snang ba nges pa* to translate *niyatapratibhāsa* in the sense of an appearance that is specific because conditioned by a real particular; hence the context and the feature discussed here are different from those cases that Rngog Lo terms *snang la ma nges pa*. In the third chapter of the PViT, one finds *snang ba nges pa* as a translation of *pratibhāsaniyama*. *Nges par byas* also translates *niścita*.

As discussed in section 3.3 above, Rngog Lo associates the notion of *nges pa* in *snang la ma nges pa* with *rtogs pa* (*adhigama*), *yongs su gcod pa* (*pariccheda*) and *zhen pa* (*adhyavasāya*). There is no evidence that he associates it with *niścaya* in the sense of a determination involving the elimination of opposite superimpositions (as advocated by Phya pa for instance, see Hugon 2011).

he acquired a knowledge of Sanskrit enabling him a direct access to the Indian sources, which he also translated. In comparison, prototypical scholars of the next generations studied in Tibet with Tibetan masters and accessed the main Indian sources via existing Tibetan translations. Rngog Lo's compositions, such as the concise guide to the NBT under consideration in this paper, are characteristic of the initial phase in the renewed spread of the Buddhist corpus that took place in Tibet at the time of the Later Diffusion. They do not only provide a simplified access to the Indian texts, but articulate the contents of the source texts by way of new categories and provided a first (?) layer of autochthonous exegesis. Later scholars benefited from such works for studying fundamental Indian treatises, and possibly even relied chiefly on such abbreviated presentations when it came to secondary Indian sources. Layers of exegesis kept being added, soon showing an emphasis on intra-Tibetan debates. As is evident in the case of the fivefold typology of invalid cognitions, the new terminology and categories articulated in these early works became part of the natural language of Tibetan epistemologists. They took a life of their own and were used as conceptual tools *quasi* independently of the Indian background from which they emerged. The gradual loss of this link with the Indian background allowed for further developments, as these tools came to be adapted by subsequent thinkers according to their own understanding and employed to deal with new issues.

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Appendix

1. Text of the Dka' gnas Relative to the Fivefold Typology

A= Sun Wenjing's edition, 32, 19–33, 21.

A'= Reading of the manuscript on which A is based, fol. 9b4–10a1.

B= Reading of the manuscript reproduced in *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum*, fol. 9b5–10a2 with additional notes

The punctuation is editorial. Variants are noted in parenthesis and refer to the underlined preceding word(s). A dashed underline indicates an unimportant variant (orthographic or graphic). Words or characters in pointed brackets are addition by the scribe; interlinear notes are given in pointed brackets in subscript font. Square brackets indicate a conjectural reading in the case of an unclear or missing character. Curly brackets indicate a deleted character. The transliteration *m* represents the *bindu* sign.

I des na tshad ma (B m) ma yin pa'i blo lnga po (B : AA' lnga'o) / snang la ma nges pa dang / bcad pa'i yul can dang / log pa'i shes pa dang / yid dpyod (A'B : A dpyad) dang / the ^{A'9b5} tshom (B tsom) rnams ni tshad ma ma yin te (AA' om.) / tha snyad pa'i (AA' : B tha snyad pa'i tshad ma) yongs su gcod byed ma _{B9b6} yin pas so //

II ^{A33} dang po gnyis (B <snang la ma nges pa dang bcad pa'i yul can>) la ni don dam par rig pa'i byed pa (AA' : B rig par byed pa) yod kyang / sngar (A' snga<r>) ma rtogs pa nges pa myed pas (B: AA' pa) yongs su gcod byed kyi tha snyad du bya ba (B <bya ba>) ma yin la /

III gsum (B gsum) pa (B <log shes>) ni (AA' : B om.) yongs su gcod byed tsam yin yang / myi slu ba myed pas log par yongs su gcod pa'i phyir dang /

IV bzhi (B <y[i]d spyod>) pa yang de'i (B <[o]g shes kyi>) rang bzhin ^{A'9b6} can (AA' : B om.) yin pa'i phyir te / dper na du ba dang dus mnyam du skyes pa'i rlangs (A: A' blangs, B glangs) pa la sogs (A' lasogs, B la rtso<gs>) _{B9b7} pa mye dang lhan cig yod kyang mye'i 'bras bu ma yin pa'i rang bzhin myi spong ba (A' pa) yin te / de dang ldog pa ma (B pa { } ma) grub pa'i phyir ro // de bzhin du (B < >⁸³) blo 'di don dang lhan cig yod kyang log pa'i shes pa (AA' : B log pa'i shes pa'i rang bzhin) don myed pa nyid du (AA' : B om.) myi spong ste / don myed kyang 'byung ba'i (A'B pa'i) phyir ro //

V lnga (B <the tsho[m]>) pa ni don ^{A'9b7} 'ga' (B 'ga) yang yongs su gcod pa ma yin te / gang yang rnam par myi gcod (B gco<d>) _{B9b8} pa'i (B om.) phyir ro // yongs su gcod pa ni (B <bzlog phyogs>) rnam par gcod pa myed par myi srid do zhes rnam (B rnam) pa mang du bshad pa yin no //

VI des na slob dpon chos mchog na re /

the tshom (B tsom) ni dngos po dang dngos po myed pa gnyi ga'i bdag nyid du 'dzin

83 Illegible.

pa yin pas log pa'i shes par 'du la / yid dpyod_{A'9b8} gsum (**B gsum**) po rgyu mtshan myed pa dang / log pa'i rgyu mtshan can dang / bden pa'i rgyu mtshan_{B10a1} gtan (**A' rtan**) la ma phebs pa can yang the tshom (**B tsom**) gyi (**A' kyi**) rang bzhin du 'dus pas / log pa'i shes pa yin no zhes zer ba yang shin tu 'khrul par gsal te (**B ste**) / the tshom (**B tsom**) gyis gnyi ga'i rang bzhin yongs su ma bcad pa'i phyir ro //

VII des na dang po gnyis ni ma rtogs (**B {}rtogs**) pa / bar pa gnyis (**A' gnyi<s>**)_{A'10a1} ni log par (**B <par>**) rtogs pa / tha ma gcig ni the tshom (**B tsom**) nyid de / de gnyis su_{B10a2} bsdu (**B bsdu**) ba ni (AA': B om.) ma yin no zhes gnas so //
de lta (AA': B ltar) na ha cang khyab pa myed do //

2. Text of the Concise Guide Relative to the Fivefold Typology

This passage is found in the manuscript in the *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum (Rigs thigs 'grel ti ka* 4b6–5a3). The reading given here is that of my forthcoming edition, to which I refer the reader for the critical apparatus. The folio and line numbers of the manuscript are given here indicatively. Words cited as markers being explained appear in bold. Names and pronouns referring to persons appear in bold underlined.

ha cang khyab pa spang ba la bzhi las

[1] log pa'i shes pa la ha cang khyab pa spong ba ni **rnam par shes pa gzhan ni** zhes bya ba'o //

'jug par byed pa ni 'jug yul ston par byed pa la yod pa_{4b7} yin no / log pa'i shes pa ni de ston pa ni ma yin te / des bstan pa ni med pas 'jug pa'i yul du mi rung ba'i phyir ro zhes bya ba'o //

[2] gnyis pa yid gnyis la khyab pa spong ba ni **kha cig ni** zhes bya ba'o //

[3] gsum pa yid dpyod la ha cang khyab pa spong ba ni **rtags med par** zhes bya ba'o //
yid dpyod rnam pa bzhi po rgyu mtshan med pa dang / log pa'i rgyu mtshan can dang / yang dag pa'i rgyu mtshan gtan la ma_{4b8} phebs pa dang / phebs kyang brjed pa ni the tshom du 'du la the tshom yang gnyis gar gyur ba med pa'i yul 'jog pas log pa'i shes par du'o zhes **slob dpon chos mchog** sems so //

bcad pa'i yul can dang snang la ma nges pa ni 'jug pa'i yul ston pa'i byed pa dang mi ldan pas na 'jug pa'i yul ston pa nyid tshad ma'i byed par brjed pas sngar dpyad pa grub pa'i phyir 'dir ma brjed do //

[4] bzhi pa 'jug 5a1 bsdu ba ni **de bas na** zhes bya ba'o //

bdag gis ni 'di ltar rig go //

shes pa ni rnam pa bzhi ste / yang dag par rtogs pa dang / ma rtogs pa dang / log par

rtogs⁸⁴ pa dang / the tshom mo //

de la dang po ni tha snyad pa'i yang dag par rtogs pa kho na yin pas tshad ma'o //

gnyis pa ni tha snyad pa'i rtogs pa'i byed pa dang bral ba yin pas snang la ma nges pa
dang bcad pa'i yul can no //

gsum pa ni med pa'i don rtogs par _{sa2} byed pa la log pa'i shes pa mtha' dag go //

bzhi ba ni gang yang nam par mi gcod pas gang yang yongs su mi gcod pa'i phyir don
'jug pa'i nus pa med pa'o //

yid dpyod mtha' dag ni log pa'i shes par 'du ste / don med par 'byung bas don med pa'i
rang bzhin dang ma bral ba'i phyir ro // dper na du ba dang dus mnyam du yod pa'i dngos
po mams ni me med kyang 'byung bas me'i 'bras bu ma yin pa'i rang bzhin dang ma bral _{sa3}
ba bzhin no //

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84 See n.63.